We study random choice rules to capture violations of the weak axiom of revealed preference. We show that the Luce rule is the unique random choice rule that admits a well-defined ranking of option sets. We consider two extensions of the Luce rule. The first, addresses the duplicates problem. The second, our most general model, accommodates three commonly observed regularities: the attraction effect, the compromise effects and the match-up effect. †
Introduction
Many formal models of individual choice incorporate or explicitly model behavior that is ruled out by standard utility maximization analysis. We can distinguish two categories of such models. New choice object models introduce a richer set of choice objects and permit novel behavior by enabling the utility functions that represent preferences to depend on new arguments. Behavioral optimization models consider familiar classes of choice objects but weaken the standard requirements on preferences to permit novel behavior patterns.
Perhaps the first example of new choice object model is the Kreps and Porteus' (1978) model of preference for timing of resolution of uncertainty. Other examples of new choice object models include the Kreps (1979) , Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) and Ergin and Sarver (2010) models of preference for flexibility and the Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) , Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009) , Stovall (2010) and Noor (2010) models of temptation and self-control.
Behavioral optimization models include models that abandon the von NeumannMorgenstern independence axiom or probabilistic sophistication in the context of choice under uncertainty. More generally, they may give up standard requirements on choice functions, such as the weak axiom of revealed preference or Houthakker's axiom and focus extensively on psychological procedures or environmental factors that influence choice outcomes.
Strotz ' (1955) model of consistent planning and Simon's (1978) model of satisficing behavior are two well-known behavioral optimization models. More recent behavioral optimization models include the Pollak (1968) and Peleg and Yaari (1973) models of consistent planning, the Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) model of status quo dependent choice and the Manzini and Mariotti's (2007) model of sequentially rationalizable choice.
New choice object models aim to incorporate richer individual objectives into economic analysis while behavioral optimization models incorporate cognitive limitations in individuals' ability to attain those objectives. 1 One plausible way to deal with cognitive 1 Note however that Strotz' work and the subsequent literature can be interpreted either as a model of a cognitive limitation (i.e., dynamic inconsistency) or a new type of individual objective (preference for commitment.) For a formal re-interpretation of Strotz' behavioral optimization model as a new choice object model, see Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) . limitations is to model behavior as random; that is, to interpret the gap between the decision maker's objectives and his limitations at meeting them as random mistakes.
There are at least two reasons why modeling behavior as random is an attractive approach: first, many deterministic violations of the weak axiom of choice are unlikely to find much empirical support; while it is reasonable to expect that a particular decision maker may choose s from the set {s, t} on one occasion and choose t from {s, t, t ′ } on another occasion, it is unlikely that this decision maker would choose s from {s, t} and t from {s, t, t ′ } on every occasion. To put it differently, a deterministic theory may be too crude for measuring the intensity of an individual's tendency to choose s over t. A second attractive feature of random choice models is that they enable different consumption outcomes without forcing the modeler to assume preference diversity. That is, random choice (or logit) models can be used as flexible representative agent models and serve as convenient aggregation devices.
Thus, random choice models facilitate measurement and aggregation; that is, allow the econometrician to quantify intensity and use the behavior of distinct individuals as evidence for a single model. Luce (1959) introduces the idea of random choice as behavioral optimization. In particular, he proposes the "random choice hypothesis," which asserts that the ratio with which option s is chosen from a set of options to the ratio with which t is chosen from the same set is constant across all sets that contain both s and t. The random choice hypothesis leads immediately to the Luce model: let ρ(a, b) be the probability that some outcome s ∈ a is chosen from the set b. 2 Then, the random choice rule ρ is a Luce rule if there exist a strictly positive real number v s for every option s so that
Standard deterministic theory implies that the decision maker has a coherent ranking of option sets. For the deterministic choice function r we can define the following ranking of option sets. Set a is better than set b (a ≽ proof of Theorem 1 establishes that ≽ ρ is also transitive whenever the richness assumption and (I) are satisfied. Hence, our characterization reveals that given richness, Luce rules are the only ones consistent with a complete and transitive ranking of option sets and hence a well defined indirect utility function. To put it differently, given richness, identifying a consistent ranking of option sets using the frequency distribution of choices is feasible if and only if the choices are induced by the Luce rule.
While Theorem 1 formalizes the sense in which the Luce model is the natural extension of the rationality hypothesis to random choice, it offers no response to some of the well known regularities that are inconsistent with Luce model. The best known such regularity was first formalized by Debreu who noted that if two items s 1 and s 2 are very similar (a yellow and red bus) and t is a third dissimilar option (a train), then it may be that each item is chosen with probability s 2 are chosen with the same probability if they are both available and the probability of choosing t from {s 1 , s 2 , t} is the same as the probability of choosing t from {s 1 , t}.
One class of extensively studied random choice rules are random utility maximizers.
Most econometric models of discrete choice such as logit, probit, nested logit, etc., are special example of random utility maximizers. A random utility is a probability distribution over utility functions and a random choice rule maximizes a random utility if the probability of choosing s for a is equal to drawing a utility function that attains its maximum in a at s. Block and Marschak (1960) show that Luce rules are random utility maximizers. In Theorem 3, below, we show that this result extends to the weighted attribute rules. Every WAR is a random utility maximizer. However, not every random utility maximizer is a WAR. In particular, WARs satisfy a property known as stochastic transitivity:
Random utility maximizers may not satisfy stochastic transitivity due to a matchup effect illustrated in the following example. The options are four cars, a red and a yellow Porsche and a red and yellow Mercedes. With equal probability the random utility picks a utility function that assigns Mercedes a higher utility than Porsche or a utility function that does the reverse. Both utility functions rank red cars above yellow cars but the make of a car is the more important characteristic so that the yellow Mercedes has a higher utility than the red Porsche for one utility function while the yellow Porsche has a higher utility than the red Porsche for the other. If ρ maximizes this random utility then it chooses each option with probability 1/2 from the choice sets A further well known regularity inconsistent with random utility maximization -and therefore inconsistent with the Luce rule and WAR -is the attraction effect (Huber, et al. (1982) ) and the related compromise effect (Simonson (1989) (Luce and Suppes (1965) a) , for all sets a, b and therefore is inconsistent with the attraction effect. The compromise effect refers to a similar nonmonotonicity where an option is chosen with greater frequency after a more extreme option is added.
We extend WARs to allow for negative attribute values and refer to the resulting model as the generalized attribute rule (GAR). The generalized attribute rule is identical to the weighted attribute rule but allows for negative attributes, that is, attributes that reduce the probability of choosing the option. Theorem 5 establishes a connection between GARs and the Shapley value of an appropriate defined cooperative game. GARs are not a subset of random utility maximizers and therefore can potentially address the attraction and compromise effects. We provide example that show how GARs can generate attraction and compromise effects. We also provide an example that shows that GARs can generate matchup effects as described in the example above.
Related Literature
Discrete choice models are used in economics, statistics and psychology. The simplest example of such a model is the model of binary comparisons: Let A = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set outcomes and let B = {ij | i, j ∈ A, i < j} be the collection of two element subsets of A.
Let Ω be any set of background variables. Then, for ω ∈ Ω, let ϕ ω (ij) be the probability of outcome i given that the experiment ij is conducted under conditions ω.
we omit the ij and when Ω is a singleton we omit the ω. Hence, in these situations we write ϕ ω and ϕ(ij) respectively.
For example, let ω ∈ Ω be the dosage of a drug that is to be administered and let A = {1, 2}, where 1 and 2 denote the patients death and survival. That is, ϕ ω is the probability that a patient who receives the dose ω survives. For an economic example, consider the case in which ω is the price of the good and let 1 be the outcome that the consumer purchases it and 2 the outcome that he does not. Then, ϕ ω is the probability of a sale given price ω.
The function ϕ is a vehicle for making assumptions on how the various ϕ ω (ij) relate to each other given a fixed ω and how a particular ϕ ω (ij) changes as ω is varied. Since our goal is to study random choice as a model of behavioral optimization, we will ignore the background variables and focus on the relationship among various choice probabilities. In practice, identifying convenient formulations that incorporate various background variables such as price, quality, dosage etc is the central part of the analysis.
Call ϕ a pseudo random utility model if there exists a continuous cumulative distribution F with support IR, η i for each i ∈ A such that F (t) + F (−t) = 1 and
The (thought) experiment is as follows: a random variable X with distribution F is drawn; Thurstone (1927) . The term probit is due to Bliss (1934) . Zermelo (1929) Berkson (1944) coins the term logit for this ϕ.
Call ϕ a simple random utility maximizer over binary choices if there are η i for each
for some X, Y with joint distribution G with zero-mean marginals. The (thought) experiment is as follows: i.i.d. random variables, X i , are drawn and the decision maker chooses the option that has the highest random utility u i = X i + η i . Thurstone (1927) observes that if G is the joint distribution of two independent normal random variables with σ = √ 2 2
and ϕ maximizes the simple random utility G, {η i } i∈A , then ϕ is the the probit model associated with the same η i 's. A more general observation in McFadden (1974) Block and Marschak (1960) had shown that every Luce rule maximizes some random utility. They also identified a set of necessary conditions, the Block-Marschak inequalities, for a random choice rule to be a random utility maximizer. Falmagne (1978) proves that these conditions are in fact sufficient. Our Theorem 3 shows that WARs are also random maximizer. Moreover, the set of random maximizers is the closed convex hull of Luce rules.
Luce Rules
Let A be a nonempty set of choice objects. A set A of subsets of A is a proper
One example of a proper collection is A f the set of all finite subsets of A.
Unless stated otherwise, all sets denoted with lower case letters are elements of A. To simplify the statements below, we use the following notational convention:
and identify s ∈ A with the singleton {s} ∈ A. Given any proper collection A, let
The first part of (1) is the feasibility constraint; ρ must choose among options available in b; the second part of (1) is the requirement that ρ(·, b) is a countably additive probability.
When we wish to be explicit about the domain, we refer to the function ρ together with the proper collection A of subsets of A as the random choice rule. When the underlying proper collection is clear, we suppress it. Luce (1959) introduces the idea of random choice as behavioral optimization. In particular, he proposes the "random choice hypothesis," which asserts that the ratio with which option s is chosen from a set of options to the ratio with which t is chosen from the same set is constant across all sets that contain both s and t. The random choice hypothesis leads immediately to the Luce model: let ρ(a, b) be the probability that some outcome s ∈ a is chosen from the set b. We write ρ(s, b) rather than ρ ({s}, b) .
Call a RCR, ρ, a Luce Rule if there exists a Luce value v such that
whenever s ∈ b ∈ A. We say that the Luce value v induces ρ if equation (2) holds for all such s, b. Clearly, every Luce value induces a unique RCR.
The Luce model is a generalization of the standard deterministic theory that allows random errors and hence is the natural benchmark for random choice as behavioral maximization. To see see this connection, let τ be a choice function; that is, τ (a) ⊂ a are the choices from a. Then, we can define the following ranking of option sets: 
Independence (I):
Theorem 1, below, shows that in a setting with a rich set of options, the Luce rule is the only RCR that satisfies independence and, therefore, the only rule that admits a consistent ranking of option sets. Next, we state the richness requirement.
Richness (R):
The following example illustrates a setting that satisfies richness.
Example 1: Let A be the set of all strictly positive real numbers, let A = A f the set of all finite subsets of A and let v s = s for all s ∈ A and let ρ be the RCR induced by this Luce value. To verify that ρ is rich, fix δ and a and c. Let
Since ac is finite such s, t must exists.
Let b = {s, t} and note that b ∈ A, b ∩ c = ∅ and ρ(a, ab) = δ 1 /(δ 1 + δ 2 ) = δ as desired.
Theorem 1: A rich RCR satisfies independence if and only if it is a Luce Rule.
Theorem 1 shows that Luce rules are identified by independence when richness is satisfied. Of course, richness is an idealization analogous to divisibility in consumer theory or small event continuity in Savage theory. Particular applied settings may not satisfy richness. Theorem 1 implies that if the Luce rule in a particular (non-rich) setting satisfies additional properties then these other properties are artefacts of the sparseness of the setting. Conversely, if an RCR satisfies independence (in a particular non-rich environment) but is not a Luce rule then this rule must violate independence if we extend the environment to a rich setting.
The following example illustrates richness and independence in a setting with a countable number of options.
Example 2: Let A be the set of all strictly positive rational numbers. Let
It is easy to verify that A is a proper collection and that v is a Luce value. Then, let ρ be the RCR induced by this Luce value. To conclude, we will verify that ρ is rich.
Let A = {s 1 , s 2 , . . .} be an enumeration of A and consider any a, c ∈ A + , and δ ∈ (0, 1).
. . as follows: Luce (1977) credits Debreu (1960) with the following example and concedes that it indicates a potentially important shortcoming of the random choice hypothesis.
The Duplicates Problem and Weighted Attributes
Example: Let A = {s 1 , s 2 , t} and let a = {s 1 , s 2 }, b = {s 1 , t} and c = {s 2 , t}. Assume that s 1 , s 2 are transparently similar options; for example, s 1 is a red bus and s 2 is a yellow bus, while t represents a clearly distinct option, for example, a train. Then, we might have
This RCR is not a Luce rule; if it were, equation (3) Each of the alternatives in Debreu's example has one of two possible attributes, it is either a bus or a train. The set a = {s 1 , s 2 } has the attribute "bus" and the set b = {t} has the attribute "train." In this example, there are just two attributes but, in general, each object may have many different attributes. For example, it could be that the train t and the yellow bus s 2 are comfortable while the red bus s 1 is not. Then, c = {s 2 , t} has the attribute "comfortable." In this way, we can identify each attribute with the set of choice objects that have the attribute. Thus, the set of attributes is a nonempty collection of subsets of A. Let C denote the set of attributes and let C a = {c ∈ C | c ∩ a} be the attributes of the set a. We require that each object has at least one attribute, that is, C s is non-empty for all s ∈ A. The function w : C → IR ++ assigns each attribute a strictly positive number. We call the pair (w, C) an attribute value on A if
A random choice rule (ρ, A) is a WAR if there exists an attribute value (w, C) such
We say that the attribute value (w, C) induces ρ if equation (5) holds for all s ∈ b ∈ A.
Clearly, every attribute value (w, C) on A induces a unique RCR (ρ, A).
To relate WARs to Luce rules, define
to be a weighted sum of the attribute values of alterative s. The weight is 1 if s is the only choice object in b that has the attribute c. In general, the weight is 1 over the number of elements in b that have the attribute c. Then, (5) can be restated as follows: as desired.
In Debreu's example, the yellow and blue buses are duplicates because we can replace a yellow with a blue bus in any option set without affecting the choice probabilities of alternatives other than the two buses. The next definition extends this notion of a duplicates to option sets. The option sets a and b are duplicates if replacing a with b has no effect on the probabilities of choosing elements that are not in a or b.
We write a ∼ b if a is a duplicate of b. The relation ∼ is symmetric and reflexive.
Next, we define the notion of overlap of option sets a and b. When a and b have elements in common they overlap. Even if a and b have no elements in common, they overlap if there are duplicates of a and b that have elements in common. For example, the option set consisting of the red bus and the train overlaps with the option set consisting of the yellow bus in Debreu's example because the red bus is a duplicate of the yellow bus.
We write a ⊥ b if a and b are non-overlapping. Next, we show that WARs can be identified as the unique rule that treats duplicates as if they were a single option but retains Independence (I) when choice sets are non-overlapping. Thus, we show that the WAR is the extension of Luce rules that addresses the duplicates problem but otherwise retains its properties. To prove this result, we must strengthen the richness assumption.
To illustrate the definition of fine sets, let ρ be a WAR. Each alternative s is described by a pair (k, j) where j is any natural number and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Alternatives s = (1, j) all have attribute one; alternatives (2, j) have attribute two and alternatives (3, j) have both attributes one and two. Thus, (k, j) and (k, j ′ ) are duplicates for all k = 1, 2, 3. Moreover
Let M = {a ∈ A | a is fine} be the fine option sets. We strengthen the richness assumption of the previous section in two ways. First, we require an analogous richness of non-overlapping option sets. Second, we require a rich collection of duplicates. Specifically, we require that each set a has a fine duplicate that is disjoint from a.
Strong Richness (R
Our first substantive assumption says that duplicates are treated like a single option.
Specifically, if a and b ′ are duplicates then adding alternatives from b ′ to a choice set that contains a does not alter the odds of choosing options that have no overlap with a.
Elimination of Duplication (E): a ∼ b ′ ⊂ b ⊥ c and s ∈ c implies ρ(s, bc) = ρ(s, abc).
If the rule satisfies (E) and duplicates are treated as a single option then Independence Weak Independence (I * ):
and ab ⊥ cd.
Theorem 2 shows that WARs are the only strongly rich choice rules that satisfy (E) and (I * ). Thus, WARs generalize Luce rules to account for duplicates but otherwise retain the independence assumption that characterizes Luce rules. Thus, each choice object s is described by a natural number i and a real number r. The natural number is analogous to the color in Debreu's example and, therefore, the objects s = (i, r) and s ′ = (j, r) are duplicates. In this example, each alternative s = (i, r) has a single attribute given by the set c s := {(j, r)|j ∈ IN }. Therefore, the set of attributes is
It is easy to verify that (w, C) is an attribute value and that the ρ it induces satisfies strong richness.
A somewhat stronger assertion about Theorem 2 can be made: let ρ be a WAR on any A, then there is an extension of ρ that satisfies richness. Specifically, there exists a set
WAR and Random Utility Maximization
In this section, we show that each WAR is a random utility model, thus proving an analogue of Block and Marschak's (1960) result for Luce rules. The rich choice rules of the previous two sections require a setting with infinitely many options. Richness facilitates the identification of qualitative properties of random choice rules but it makes it more difficult to relate WARs to random utility models. Therefore, we introduce a simpler setting with finitely many options to relate WARs to random utility models. The finite setting also proves useful for extensions of WARs that are the subject of the next two sections.
We say that a RCR is simple if A = {1, . . . , n} for some n ≥ 1. It follows that any simple RCR can be identified with some q ∈ IR
for all a ∈ A. Such a q satisfies
Let Q be the set of all q ∈ IR n(2 n −1) + that satisfy equation (6). Let Q l be the set of all simple Luce rules and Q w be the set of all simple WARs.
If q ∈ Q w there is an attribute value (C, w) that generates q. When A is finite, it is convenient to represent the (C, w) by a normalized function γ :
Clearly, each attribute value can be represented by a γ and each γ corresponds to an attribute value as defined in the previous section. We call such a γ : A + → IR + a simple attribute value. It satisfies:
where
for all b ∈ A + and i ∈ b. A simple RCR q is an WAR if some γ ∈ Γ 1 induces it.
One class of extensively studied RCRs are random utility maximizers. Most econometric models of discrete choice such as logit, probit, nested logit, etc., are special example of random utility maximizers. Below we define, Q r , the set of RCR that are random utility maximizers.
Let U be the set of all bijections from A to A. For any i ∈ a ⊂ A, let
We identify each such function with an element in IR |U |
be the set of all random utilities. Hence, Π is the |U | − 1 = n! − 1-dimensional unit simplex.
The simple RCR q maximizes the random utility π if q ia = ∑ u∈ [ia] π u for all i, a. A simple RCR q is a random utility maximizer if there exists some π that it maximizes. Let Q r denote the set of random utility maximizers.
Theorem 3 shows that every WAR is a random utility maximizer, i.e., Q w ⊂ Q r . That Luce rules are random utility maximizers was shown by Block and Marschak (1960) . For any subset X ∈ IR k , let clX denote the closure of X and let convX denote its convex hull.
Let q ∈ Q w and let γ generate q. If i is chosen with probability greater than 1/2 from the choice set {i, j} then it must that the sum of i's attribute values (equally weighted)
is greater than the sum of j's attribute values. That is, for q ∈ Q w . The following example shows that there are random utility maximizers that cannot be approximated by a WAR, that is, cl Q w ̸ = Q r . The example builds on the fact that random utility models may violate stochastic transitivity.
Violations of Stochastic Transitivity: the Match-up effect
The match-up effect refers to violations of stochastic transitivity, as illustrated in the following example. Let A = {m r , m y , p r , p y } be the set of options where m r , m y refer to a red and yellow Mercedes while p r and p y refer to a red and yellow Porsche. Color is not an important characteristic but red is always chosen over yellow. Hence,
whenever m r ∈ a ∩ c and p r ∈ b ∩ c. Moreover, when both red cars are available, each is chosen with probability 1/2:
whenever m r ∈ a and p r ∈ a. The make of the car is a much more important issue than color. Since both makes are chosen with equal probability, we therefore have
whenever m y ∈ a, p y ∈ b, m r / ∈ a and p r / ∈ b. Equations (7)- (9) However, the matchup effect is consistent with random utility maximization. To see that the RCR defined in (7)- (9) is an element of
Verifying that the RCR q maximizes this random utility is straightforward.
A Shapley Value Representation of WARs
In this section, we provide an alternative representation of WARs as the Shapley value of a cooperative game. As in the previous section, we consider a simple RCR q represented by simple attribute value γ ∈ Γ 1 . For each set a ∈ A + we can define the attribute value of a as
Hence, κ(a) is value of the attributes of the set a. Note that κ satisfies the following
for all a ̸ = 0 and (iv) κ(A) = 1. A function that satisfies properties (i) and (ii) is called a characteristic function. A function that satisfies properties (i)-(iv) is called a capacity.
We write K for the set of capacities. Note that the usual definition of a capacity does not include requirement (iii). We add this requirement to the definition of a capacity to avoid having to introduce a new term.
For any κ ∈ K define the characteristic function κ a on A as follows:
The characteristic function κ a satisfies (i), (ii), (iv) but fails (iii) unless a = A. 
is a random choice rule.
For γ ∈ Γ 1 let κ γ be defined as the capacity κ such that equation (10) holds and let K 1 be the set of capacities for which (9) holds for some γ ∈ Γ 1 . Lemma 1 shows that the probability that the simple WAR q with value γ chooses i from a is equal to the Shapley value of i in the cooperative game with characteristic function κ γ a .
Lemma 1: If
for all a ∈ A + and i ∈ A.
Lemma 1 then implies the following alternative characterization of WARs in terms of the Shapley values of appropriately defined cooperative games.
Theorem 4: A simple RCR q is an WAR if and only if there exists
The capacity κ is an element of K 1 if (10) holds for some simple attribute value.
Capacities that can be generated by simple attribute values are a proper subset of all capacities. The key restriction is that γ is non-negative for all a ∈ A. This suggests a generalization of WARs that allows attributes with negative values. The next section introduces this generalization and uses it to address the matchup effect (Example 3), the attraction effect and the compromise effect.
The Generalized Attribute Rules
In the previous section, we defined a set of capacities that can be generated by simple attribute values γ ∈ Γ 1 . As we show next, the set of all capacities can be obtained if we allow the attribute value to be negative. A function γ : A + → IR is a generalized attribute
for all a, b ∈ A such that b ̸ = a ⊂ b. Let Γ denote the set of all generalized attribute values.
As above, we can associate each γ ∈ Γ with a function κ γ such that
Our next result, Lemma 2, shows that if γ is a generalized attribute value then κ γ is a capacity.
Lemma 2: For all κ ∈ K, there exists a unique γ ∈ Γ such that κ = κ γ .
As an illustration of Lemma 2, suppose A = {1, 2} and κ(1) = κ(2) = 1/3, κ({1, 2}) = 1. This capacity corresponds to the generalized attribute value γ such that γ(1) = γ(2) = 2/3 and γ({1, 2}) = −1/3. Thus, each options has a unique attribute with value 2/3 and both options share a negative attribute with value −1/3.
We can use the generalized attribute value γ ∈ Γ to calculate the weighted average attribute value for each element i of the option set a as:
and define simple random choice rule q as
It is easy to check that (13) can be rewritten as
We refer to random choice rules that can be represented as in (14) as generalized attribute rules (GAR). Next, we show that the Shapley value characterization of WARs extends to GARs. Lemma 3, below, shows that Lemma 1 above extends to all capacities.
Theorem 5 shows that all GARs have a Shapley value characterization. Hence, Theorem 5 is the analogue of Theorem 4 above.
Theorem 5: A RCR q is an GAR if and only if there exists
Theorem 5 characterizes GARs in terms of the Shapley value of the associated capacity that measures the attribute value of each set of options. Next, we illustrate how
Violations of Stochastic Transitivity
GARs allow violations of stochastic transitivity as described in Example 3. For simplicity, we describe the capacity rather than the attribute values. 4 To match the behavior of the RCR q, defined by (7)- (9), consider any capacity κ on A = {m r , m y , p r , p y } that
as ϵ → 0. Similar calculations show that, as ϵ → 0, this capacity replicates the choice probabilities (7)- (9) above. This shows that GARs can accommodate violations of stochastic transitivity.
The Attraction Effect
Two well known regularities inconsistent with the Luce rule and WAR is the attraction effect (Huber, et. al. (1982) ) and the related compromise effect (Simonson (1989) 
Note that random utility maximization implies monotone random choice rules (Luce and Suppes (1965) ); that is, ρ(s, ab) ≤ ρ(s, a), whenever s ∈ a and, therefore, is inconsistent with the attraction effect. The compromise effect refers to a similar non-monotonicity where an option is chosen with greater frequency after a more extreme option is added.
As Huber and Puto (1983) explain, a typical experimental study of the attraction effect compares choice frequencies of options differentiated along two dimensions, for example, quality and price (or color and make). Two comparably attractive core items such as a high-price, high-quality option and a low-price, low-quality option are designed (these correspond to the red cars in our example). Next, two decoy options are defined (the yellow cars). The decoys are inferior in the sense that they are rarely chosen when the corresponding core option is available. The typical experiment finds choice frequencies as in equation (3) above. Thus, each decoy attracts consumers to the corresponding core item. The following example illustrates how GARs can generate attraction effects. Let
The attribute is zero for all sets other than the sets listed above. With this GAR, (i) core items have higher singleton attribute values than decoys, (ii) each decoy shares a common negative attribute with its own core item and (iii) shares a positive attribute with the other core item. Applying the GAR formula, we obtain the following choice probabilities in the limit as ϵ → 0:
Property (ii) is necessary for a decoy to increase the market share of the corresponding core item and generate the attraction effect; without negative attributes the random choice rule is a WAR and therefore, by Theorem 3, satisfies monotonicity.
Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed three nested models, the Luce rule, WAR and GAR. We have shown that the Luce rule is the unique random choice rule that admits a well-defined ranking of option sets. However, the Luce rule has well-known shortcomings, perhaps the most prominent among them is the duplicates problem, first pointed out by Debreu. The 
Proof of Theorem 1
Verifying that every Luce rule satisfies independence is straightforward. Hence, we will only prove that a rich RCR that satisfies independence is a Luce rule.
Define a binary relation ≽ ρ on A + as follows: a ≽ ρ b if and only if ρ(a, ac) ≥ ρ (b, bc) for all c ∈ A + such that ab ∩ c = ∅. Let ∼ ρ be the symmetric and ≻ ρ be the strict part of
Throughout the following lemmas, we assume that ρ satisfies (R) and (I).
Lemma A1: ≽ ρ is complete and transitive.
Proof: Clearly, ρ satisfies (I) only if ≽ ρ is complete. Next, assume that a ≽ ρ b and b ≽ ρ c. c, cd) ; thus independence implies a ≽ ρ c as desired.
Definition:
The sequence a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ A is a test sequence if the elements are pairwise
Proof: Note that if the result is true for n = 3, then it is true for all n. So assume n = 3
and suppose ρ( a 3 a 2 ) , independence also implies a 1 ∼ ρ a 3 . Then, by Lemma A1 we have
Lemma A3: If a 1 , . . . , a n is a test sequence and a ∈ A + with a ∩ a 1 a 2 · · · a n = ∅ then
Proof: If necessary use richness to extend the test sequence so that n ≥ 3. Then, Lemma A2 implies a i ∼ ρ a j for all i, j and hence ρ(a, aa i ) = ρ(a, aa 1 ) for all i. 
Proof: By induction on n. When n = 1, the statement is true by Lemma A6. Next, assume it is true for n and let a i 1 , . . . , a i 2 n+1 be 2 n+1 distinct elements of a test sequence.
Also let a j 1 , . . . , a j 2 n+1 be another 2 n+1 distinct elements of the same test sequence. Let 
Proof: By (R) we can find a 2 n +2 such that a 1 , . . . , a 2 n +1 , a 2 n +2 is a test sequence. Then for any j > 1 we have
where the second equality is implied by Lemma A7. Then, the feasibility constraint and the additivity of ρ yield the desired result. 
Proof: Note that m ≥ n and choose an integer k such that 2 k > m. By (R) we can find
and (I) then yields the desired result.
Proof: By (R) we can find a n+1 such that a 1 , . . . , a n+1 is a test sequence. Then for any j > 1 we have
where the second equality is implied by Lemma A9. Then, the feasibility constraint and the additivity of ρ yield the desired result. 
n for all i, j. Then, the additivity of ρ yields the desired result. Proof: To prove thatv is well-defined, we first note that by Lemma A12,v(a) < ∞ for all a disjoint from a o . Next, suppose a 1 , a 2 are such that Suppose the assertion is true whenever |a ′ | = n and let |a| = n + 1 for some n ≥ 1. (ii) Assume a, b ∈ B and there is a
and hence applying Lemma A19 again yields an onto function
. By Lemma A20, h must be a bijection. Hence, there are s ∈ a and t ∈ a such that t ∼ s. Define the RCR ρ B on the proper collection B is as follows: Then, since a n ∈ B 0 , Lemma A28 implies
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 3
Take any q ∈ Q l and let v be the corresponding Luce value. Define w as follows:
w(a) = 0 whenever a is not a singleton and w(i) = v i for all i. Clearly, this attribute value induces q and therefore q ∈ Q w proving Q l ⊂ Q w .
Next, we will prove that Q r = cl conv Q l . The first fact below requires no proof. 
Fact 3:
The set Q r is compact and convex.
Proof: That Q r is convex follows from facts 1 and 2 above. Next, we will prove that Q r is compact. Falmagne 5 (1978) showed that q ∈ Q if and only if
for all i ∈ A and a ∈ A + . Let C be the subset of IR n(2 n −1) + that satisfies the inequalities above. Clearly, C is closed and by Falmange's theorem Q r = Q ∩ C. Since Q r is the intersection of a closed and (by fact 1) compact set, it too is compact.
The following well-know result was first proved by Block and Marschak (1960) :
Facts 3 and 4 imply cl conv Q l ⊂ Q r . The fact below establishes the reverse inclusion and yields cl conv Q l = Q r Fact 5: For every ϵ ′ > 0 and q ∈ Q r , there existsq such that |q −q| < ϵ ′ .
Proof: Assume 0 < ϵ < 1 and for any u ∈ U , define the Luce value v ϵu as follows:
Let δ u be the degenerate random utility that assigns probability 1 to u and let q LetŪ be the set of all bijections from A to {1, . . . , 2 n − 1} and letΠ be the set of all probability distributions onŪ . We extend each u * ∈ U * toŪ by choosingū ∈Ū such that ( 
We will prove that q ∈ Q r by showing (1) ρū ∈ Q r for allū ∈Ū and (2) q = ρη * . Note that (1) and (2) together establish that q is a convex combination of RCRs that are in Q r which together with Fact 3 above yields q ∈ Q r . . It is straightforward to verify that ρ T 0 (ū) = ρū. Next, let T 1 (π) = ∑ū ∈Ū π(ū)T 0 (ū) and for n > 1, let T k (η) = T 1 (T k−1 (η)). Once again, it is easy to verify that ρ T 1 (η) = ρ η .
Clearly, T 0 (ū) =ū wheneverū ∈ U 1 . Hence, for k sufficiently large, T k (η) ∈Π 1 . Then, a simple inductive argument ensures that ρū = ρ T k (ū) proving the claim. 
Proof of Theorems 4 and 5
First, we will prove Lemma 1. Take any q ∈ Q and assume that there exists some dual totally monotone κ such that
for all a ∈ A + and i ∈ A. Since κ is dual monotone, there exists a probability γ on A + such that
(b).
For c ∈ A + , let γ c denote the element of Γ 1 that assigns probability 1 to c. Clearly, . Note that the attribute value γ ∈ Γ also induces ρ. Then, the display equation above implies q ia = L κ a (i) for all a ∈ A + and i ∈ A.
